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Abstract
Workers in insect societies are sometimes observed to kill male eggs of other workers, a phe-
nomenon known as worker policing. We perform a mathematical analysis of the evolutionary
dynamics of policing. We investigate the selective forces behind policing for both dominant
and recessive mutations for different numbers of matings of the queen. The traditional,
relatedness-based argument suggests that policing evolves if the queen mates with more
than two males, but does not evolve if the queen mates with a single male. We derive precise
conditions for the invasion and stability of policing alleles. We find that the relatedness-
based argument is not robust with respect to small changes in colony efficiency caused by
policing. We also calculate evolutionarily singular strategies and determine when they are
evolutionarily stable. We use a population genetics approach that applies to dominant or
recessive mutations of any effect size.
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1. Introduction
In populations with haplodiploid genetics, unfertilized female workers are capable of
laying male eggs. Thus, in a haplodiploid colony, male eggs can in principle originate from
the queen or from the workers. Worker policing is a phenomenon where female workers
kill the male eggs of unmated female workers (Ratnieks, 1988; Ratnieks and Visscher, 1989;
Ratnieks et al., 2006; Gadagkar, 2001; Wenseleers and Ratnieks, 2006a). Worker policing is
observed in many social insects, including ants, bees, and wasps. Yet the precise conditions
for the evolution of worker policing are still unclear.
Worker policing (Ratnieks, 1988; Ratnieks et al., 2006; Gadagkar, 2001; Wenseleers and
Ratnieks, 2006a) and worker sterility (Wilson, 1971; Hamilton, 1972; Olejarz et al., 2015) are
two distinct phenomena that are widespread in the eusocial Hymenoptera. In addition to
worker policing, a subset of workers in a colony may forego their own reproductive potential
to aid in raising their siblings. Prior relatedness-based arguments have suggested that queen
monogamy is important for the evolution of a non-reproductive worker caste (Hughes et al.,
2008; Cornwallis et al., 2010; Queller and Strassmann, 1998; Foster et al., 2006; Boomsma,
2007, 2009). In contrast, it is believed that polygamy—not monogamy—is important for the
evolution of police workers.
Several papers have studied the evolution of policing. Starr (1984) explores various
topics in the reproductive biology and sociobiology of eusocial Hymenoptera. He defines
promiscuity as 1/(
∑n
i=1 f
2
i ), where n is the number of matings of each queen, and fi is the
fractional contribution to daughters by the i-th male mate. He writes, regarding workers,
that “They are on average less related to nephews than brothers whenever [promiscuity is
greater than two] and should prefer that the queen lay all the male eggs. Workers would
therefore be expected to interfere with each other’s reproduction.” Thus, Starr (1984) was
the first to suggest that workers should raise their nephews (sons of other workers) if the
queen mates once, but should only raise their brothers (sons of the queen) if the queen
mates more than twice. Starr (1984) uses a relatedness-based argument, but he does not
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provide any calculation of evolutionary dynamics in support of his argument; he uses neither
population genetics nor inclusive fitness theory. In a book on honeybee ecology, Seeley
(1985) also proposed, using a relatedness-based argument, that worker policing should occur
in colonies with multiply mated queens, but that worker policing should be absent if queens
are singly mated.
Woyciechowski and Lomnicki (1987) perform a calculation based on population genetics
and conclude that workers should raise their nephews (sons of other workers) if the queen
mates once, but should only raise their brothers (sons of the queen) if the queen mates
more than twice—the case of double mating is neutral with respect to preference. From this
result, they claim that, under multiple mating of the queen, natural selection should favor
non-reproductive workers. Woyciechowski and Lomnicki (1987) consider both dominant and
recessive alleles affecting worker behavior, but they do not consider colony efficiency effects.
Ratnieks (1988) considers the invasion of a dominant allele for policing. Using population
genetics, he arrives at essentially the same conclusion as Woyciechowski and Lomnicki (1987):
In the absence of efficiency effects, policing evolves with triple mating but not with single
mating. But Ratnieks also considers colony efficiency effects, focusing mainly on the case
where policing improves colony efficiency. Since policing occurs alongside other maintenance
tasks (such as cleaning of cells, removal of pathogens, incubation of brood), and since eating
worker-laid eggs might allow workers to recycle some of the energy lost from laying eggs,
Ratnieks supposes that policing improves colony efficiency. He finds that worker policing
with singly mated queens may evolve if policing improves colony reproductive efficiency. He
also finds that worker policing with triply mated queens may not evolve if policing reduces
colony reproductive efficiency, but he considered this case to be unlikely on empirical grounds.
Ratnieks does not study recessive policing alleles. He also does not calculate evolutionary
stability conditions.
Both papers (Woyciechowski and Lomnicki, 1987; Ratnieks, 1988) offer calculations based
on population genetics without mentioning or calculating inclusive fitness. These early stud-
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ies (Starr, 1984; Seeley, 1985; Woyciechowski and Lomnicki, 1987; Ratnieks, 1988) were
instrumental in establishing the field of worker policing.
Testing theoretical predictions on the evolution of worker policing in the field or in the lab
is difficult. Due to the complexities inherent in insect sociality, published empirical results are
not always easy to interpret. While, so far, worker policing has been found in all species with
multiple mating that have been studied, it has also been found in about 20% of species with
singly mated queens (Hammond and Keller, 2004; Wenseleers and Ratnieks, 2006b; Bonckaert
et al., 2008). Herein lies the difficulty: When worker policing is found in multiply mated
species and found to be absent in singly mated species, this is taken as evidence supporting
the relatedness argument, and when worker policing is found in singly mated species, it is
explained away as not being evidence against the theory, but as having evolved for other
reasons (such as colony efficiency). See, for example, the following quotation by Bonckaert
et al. (2008): “Nevertheless, our results are important in that they show that V. germanica
forms no exception to the rule that worker reproduction should be effectively policed in a
species where queens mate multiple times (Ratnieks, 1988). Indeed, any exception to this
pattern would be a much bigger challenge to the theory than the occurrence of worker policing
in species with single mating, which can be readily explained (Ratnieks, 1988; Foster and
Ratnieks, 2001b).” This is precisely why a careful simultaneous consideration of relatedness,
male parentage, and colony efficiency is important for understanding worker policing.
We do not aim to provide an exhaustive catalog of all species in which worker policing
has been studied. We merely cite some specific examples to add context. Policing is rampant
in colonies of the honeybee (Ratnieks and Visscher, 1989), the wasp Vespula vulgaris (Foster
and Ratnieks, 2001c), and the wasp Vespula germanica (Bonckaert et al., 2008), which are all
multiply mated. (As mentioned above, worker policing has been found in all of the studied
species to date that are multiply mated.) Worker removal of worker-laid eggs is much less
prevalent in colonies of the bumblebee (Velthuis et al., 2002), the stingless bee, (Peters
et al., 1999), and the wasp Vespula rufa (Wenseleers et al., 2005), which are predominantly
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singly mated. (As mentioned above, worker policing has been found only in about 20% of the
studied species to date that are singly mated.) There are some studies based on observational
evidence that find policing in singly mated species; examples of species with single mating
and worker policing are Vespa crabro (Foster et al., 2002), Camponotus floridanus (Endler
et al., 2004), Aphaenogaster smythiesi (Wenseleers and Ratnieks, 2006b), and Diacamma
(Wenseleers and Ratnieks, 2006b).
Interspecies comparisons are somewhat problematic, because even though phylogeny can
be controlled for, there are many (known and unknown) ways in which species differ in
addition to mating frequency that may also affect the absence or presence of worker polic-
ing. Furthermore, many empirical studies are based on genetic analyses of male parentage.
(Though studies of some species are based on actual observational evidence; see, e.g., Wense-
leers and Ratnieks (2006b).) Regarding species for which the study of policing is based on
genetic analyses, policing is often inferred if males are found to originate predominantly
from the queen. But such an inference, in cases where it is made, presupposes that workers
actively try to lay male eggs in the first place. It is therefore not clear how reliably genetic
investigations can measure policing.
The small number of attempts at measuring the prevalence of worker policing in in-
traspecific experiments have also returned conflicting results. Foster and Ratnieks (2000)
report that facultative worker policing in the saxon wasp, Dolichovespula saxonica, is more
common in colonies headed by multiply mated queens. But their sample size is only nine
colonies. The phenomenon was reinvestigated by Bonckaert et al. (2011) who report no evi-
dence of facultative worker policing depending on queen mating frequencies, and argue that
the previous result may have been flawed or that there were interpopulational variations.
Many empirical studies have emphasized that factors besides intracolony relatedness—
including the effects of policing on a colony’s rate of production of offspring—may play a
role in explaining evolution of worker policing (Foster and Ratnieks, 2001a,c; Hartmann
et al., 2003; Hammond and Keller, 2004; Wenseleers and Ratnieks, 2006b; Helantera and
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Sundstrom, 2007; Khila and Abouheif, 2008; Zanette et al., 2012). Yet reliable published
data on the effect that policing has on colony reproductive efficiency are often hard to find.
(For some exceptions, see Wenseleers et al. (2013) and references therein.)
In this paper, we derive precise conditions for the evolutionary invasion and evolutionary
stability of police alleles. We consider any number of matings, changes in the proportion of
queen-derived males, changes in colony efficiency, and both dominant and recessive mutations
that affect the intensity of policing.
Our paper is based on an analysis of evolutionary dynamics and population genetics of
haplodiploid species (Nowak et al., 2010; Olejarz et al., 2015). It does not use inclusive fitness
theory. Specifically, we adapt the mathematical approach that was developed by Olejarz et
al. (2015) for the evolution of non-reproductive workers. We derive evolutionary invasion
and stability conditions for police alleles. Mathematical details are given in Appendix A.
In Section 2, we present the basic model and state the general result for any number of
matings for dominant policing alleles. In Sections 3, 4, and 5, we specifically discuss single,
double, and triple mating for dominant policing alleles. We take dominance of the policing
allele to be the more realistic possibility because the policing phenotype is a gained function.
Nonetheless, for completeness, we give the general result for recessive policing alleles in
Section 6. In Section 7, we discuss how the shape of the efficiency function determines
whether or not policing is more likely to evolve for single or multiple matings. In Section 8,
we analyze our results for the case where the phenotypic mutation induced by the mutant
allele is weak (or, equivalently in our formalism, the case of weak penetrance). In this setting,
the quantity of interest is the intensity of policing. We locate the evolutionarily singular
strategies. These are the values of intensity of policing for which mutant workers with slightly
different policing behavior are, to first order in the mutant phenotype, neither advantageous
nor disadvantageous. We then determine if a singular strategy is an evolutionarily stable
strategy (ESS). In Section 9, we discuss the relationship between policing and inclusive
fitness theory, together with the limitations of the relatedness-based argument. Section 10
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concludes.
2. The model
We investigate worker policing in insect colonies with haplodiploid genetics. Each queen
mates n times. We derive conditions under which a mutation that effects worker policing
can spread in a population. We make the simplifying assumption, as do Woyciechowski
and Lomnicki (1987) and Ratnieks (1988), that the colony’s sex ratio is not affected by the
intensity of worker policing.
First we consider the case of a dominant mutant allele. Because the policing allele confers
a gain of function on its bearer, the assumption that it is dominant is reasonable. There
are two types of males, A and a. There are three types of females, AA, Aa, and aa. If the
mutant allele is dominant, then Aa and aa workers kill the male eggs of other workers, while
AA workers do not. (Alternatively, AA workers police with intensity ZAA, while Aa and aa
workers police with intensity ZAa = Zaa = ZAA+w. We consider this case in Section 8.) For
n matings, there are 3(n + 1) types of mated queens. We use the notation AA,m; Aa,m;
and aa,m to denote the genome of the queen and the number, m, of her matings that were
with mutant males, a. The parameter m can assume values 0, 1, ..., n. A schematic of the
possible mating events is shown in Figure 1(a).
There are three types of females, AA, Aa, and aa, and there are n+ 1 possible combina-
tions of males that each queen can mate with. (For example, a queen that mates three times
(n = 3) can mate with three type A males, two type A males and one type a male, one type
A male and two type a males, or three type a males.) Figure 1(b) shows the different colony
types and the offspring of each type of colony when each queen is singly mated. Figure 1(c)
shows the different colony types and the offspring of each type of colony when each queen
mates n times. The invasion of the mutant allele only depends on a subset of colony types.
The calculations of invasion conditions are presented in detail in Appendix A.
7
Figure 1: (a) The possible mating events with haplodiploid genetics are shown. Each queen
mates with n males. m denotes the number of times that a queen mates with mutant type a
males and can take values between 0 and n. Thus, there are 3(n+ 1) types of colonies. (b)
If each queen mates with only a single male, then there are six types of colonies. The female
and male offspring (right three columns) of each colony (leftmost column) are shown. For
example, AA, 1 colonies arise from a type AA female mating with a single mutant type a
male. AA, 1 queens produce female offspring of type Aa and male offspring of type A. 50%
of the offspring of workers in AA, 1 colonies are of type A, while the remaining 50% of the
offspring of workers in AA, 1 colonies are of type a. (c) The female and male offspring (right
three columns) of each colony (leftmost column) when each queen mates n times are shown.
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Figure 2: The queen’s production of male eggs, pz, increases with the fraction of workers
that are policing, z. This is intuitive, since having a larger worker police force means that
a greater amount of worker-laid eggs can be eaten or removed. Three possibilities for a
monotonically increasing function pz are shown.
2.1. Fraction of male offspring produced by the queen
pz represents the fraction of males that are queen-derived if the fraction of police workers
is z. (This quantity was already employed by Ratnieks (1988).) The parameter z can vary
between 0 and 1. For z = 0, there are no police workers in the colony, and for z = 1,
all workers in the colony are policing. We expect that pz is an increasing function of z.
Increasing the fraction of police workers increases the fraction of surviving male eggs that
come from the queen (Figure 2).
2.2. Colony efficiency as a function of policing
rz represents the rate at which a colony produces offspring (virgin queens and males) if
the fraction of police workers is z. (This quantity was also employed by Ratnieks (1988).)
Without loss of generality we can set r0 = 1. For a given mutation that affects the intensity
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Figure 3: The functional dependence of colony efficiency, rz, on the fraction of workers that
are policing, z, may take any one of many possibilities.
of policing, and for a given biological setting, the efficiency function rz may take any one of
a variety of forms (Figure 3).
Colony efficiency depends on interactions among police workers and other colony mem-
bers. It also depends on the interactions of colonies and their environment. There are some
obvious negative effects that policing can have on colony efficiency. By the act of killing
eggs, police workers are directly diminishing the number of potential offspring. In the pro-
cess of identifying and killing nephews, police workers may also be expending energy that
could otherwise be spent on important colony maintenance tasks (Cole, 1986; Naeger et al.,
2013). Policing can also be costly if there are recognitional mistakes, i.e., queen-laid eggs
may accidentally be removed by workers. Recognitional errors could result in modifications
to the sex ratio, which is an important extension of our model but is beyond the scope of
this paper.
We can also identify positive effects that policing may have on colony efficiency. It has
been hypothesized that the eggs which are killed by police workers may be less viable than
other male eggs (Velthuis et al., 2002; Pirk et al., 2004; Gadagkar, 2004; Nonacs, 2006),
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although this possibility has been disputed (Beekman and Oldroyd, 2005; Helantera et al.,
2006; Zanette et al., 2012). If less-viable worker-laid eggs are competing with more-viable
queen-laid male eggs, then policing may contribute positively to overall colony efficiency.
Moreover, policing decreases the incentive for workers to expend their energy laying eggs
in the first place (Foster and Ratnieks, 2001a; Wenseleers et al., 2004a,b; Wenseleers and
Ratnieks, 2006a), which could be another positive influence on colony efficiency. (However,
the decrease in incentive for workers to reproduce due to policing would only arise on a short
time scale if there is a facultative response to policing, which is unlikely.)
As another speculative possibility: Could it be that worker egg-laying and subsequent
policing acts as a form of redistribution within the colony? That is, suppose that it is
better for colony efficiency to have many average-condition workers than to have some in
poor condition and some in good condition. Suppose further, as seems realistic, that good-
condition workers are more likely to lay eggs (which are high in nutritional content, of course).
If the average police worker is of condition below the average egg-laying worker, then worker
egg-laying and policing serves to redistribute condition among the workers, improving overall
colony efficiency.
The special case, where policing has no effect on colony efficiency and which has informed
the conventional wisdom, is ungeneric, because policing certainly has energetic consequences
for the colony that cannot be expected to balance out completely. An early theoretical
investigation of colony efficiency effects regarding invasion of dominant mutations that effect
worker policing was performed by Ratnieks (1988).
Although monotonically increasing or monotonically decreasing functions rz are the sim-
plest possibilities, these cases are not exhaustive. For example, a small or moderate amount
of policing may be expected to improve colony efficiency. However, the precise number of
police workers that are needed to effectively police the entire worker population is unclear. It
is possible that a fraction z < 1 of police workers can effectively police the entire population,
and adding additional police workers beyond a certain point could result in wasted energy,
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inefficient use of colony resources, additional recognitional errors, etc. These effects may
correspond to colony efficiency rz reaching a maximum value for some 0 < z < 1.
As another possibility, suppose that police workers, when their number is rare, directly
decrease colony efficiency by the act of killing male eggs. It is possible that for some z < 1,
police workers are sufficiently abundant that their presence can be detected by other workers.
Assuming the possibility of some type of facultative response, the potentially reproductive
workers may behaviorally adapt by reducing their propensity to lay male eggs, instead di-
recting their energy at raising the queen’s offspring. In this scenario, colony efficiency rz
may reach a minimum value for some 0 < z < 1.
2.3. Main results for dominant police alleles
We derive the following main results for dominant police alleles. If the queen mates with
n males, then the a allele for policing can invade an A resident population provided the
following “evolutionary invasion condition” holds:
p1/n + p1/2
2
(
r1/n
r0
)(
r1/2
r0
)
> 2−
(
r1/2
r0
)
− (1− p1/n)(r1/n
r0
)
(1)
When considering only one mutation, r0 can be set as 1 without loss of generality. Why are
the four parameters, r1/n, r1/2, p1/n, and p1/2, sufficient to quantify the condition for invasion
of the mutant allele, a? Since we consider invasion of a, the frequency of the mutant allele is
low. Therefore, almost all colonies are of type AA, 0, which means a wild-type queen, AA,
has mated with n wild-type males, A, and 0 mutant males, a. In addition, the colonies Aa, 0
and AA, 1 are relevant. These are all colony types that include exactly one mutant allele.
Colony types that include more than one mutant allele (such as Aa, 1 or AA, 2) are too rare
to contribute to the invasion dynamics. For an Aa, 0 colony, half of all workers are policing,
and therefore the parameters r1/2 and p1/2 occur in Equation (1). For an AA, 1 colony, 1/n
of all workers are policing, which explains the occurrence of r1/n and p1/n in Equation (1).
Next, we ask the converse question: What happens if a population in which all workers
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are policing is perturbed by the introduction of a rare mutant allele that prevents workers
from policing? If the a allele for worker policing is fully dominant, and if colony efficiency
is affected by policing, then a resident policing population is stable against invasion by
non-police workers if the following “evolutionary stability condition” holds:
r1
r(2n−1)/(2n)
>
(2 + n)(2 + p1) + p(2n−1)/(2n)(n− 2)
2(2 + n+ np1)
(2)
What is the intuition behind the occurrence of the four parameters, r1, r(2n−1)/(2n), p1, and
p(2n−1)/(2n)? The condition applies to a population in which all workers are initially policing.
Note that, because the allele, a, for policing is fully dominant in our treatment, non-policing
behavior arises if at least two mutant A alleles for non-policing are present in the genome of
the colony, which is the combination of the queen’s genome and the sperm she has stored.
To study the invasion of a non-policing mutant allele, we must consider all colony types that
have 0, 1, or 2 mutant A alleles; these are aa, n; aa, n − 1; Aa, n; aa, n − 2; Aa, n − 1; and
AA, n. The colonies aa, n; aa, n − 1; Aa, n; aa, n − 2; and AA, n do not contain non-police
workers; the efficiency of those colonies is r1, and the fraction of male eggs that originate
from the queen in those colonies is p1. Both of these parameters occur in Equation (2).
Colonies of type Aa, n − 1 produce a fraction of 1/(2n) non-police workers, which explains
the occurrence of r(2n−1)/(2n) and p(2n−1)/(2n) in Equation (2).
Numerical simulations of the evolutionary dynamics with a dominant police allele are
shown in Figure 4.
Generally, four scenarios regarding the two pure equilibria are possible: Policing may not
be able to invade and be unstable, policing may not be able to invade but be stable, policing
may be able to invade but be unstable, or policing may be able to invade and be stable. The
possibilities are shown in Figure 5. In the cases where policing cannot invade but is stable,
or where policing can invade but is unstable, Brouwer’s fixed-point theorem guarantees the
existence of at least one mixed equilibrium. In the case where policing can invade but is
unstable, police and non-police workers will coexist indefinitely.
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Figure 4: Numerical simulations of the evolutionary dynamics of worker policing confirm the
condition given by Equation (1). The policing allele is dominant. For numerically probing
invasion, we use the initial condition XAA,0 = 1 − 10−3 and XAA,1 = 10−3. We set r0 = 1
without loss of generality. Other parameters are: (a) p1/2 = 0.75, p1 = 0.9, and r1/2 = 1.01;
(b) p1/2 = 0.6, p1 = 0.8, r3/4 = 1.005, and r1 = 1.01.
Figure 5: There are four possibilities for the dynamical behavior in the proximity of two
pure equilibria.
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We will now discuss the implications of our results for particular numbers of matings.
3. Single mating
For single mating, n = 1, the invasion condition for a dominant police allele is
r1 >
2(2− r1/2)
2(1− p1) + (p1 + p1/2)r1/2 (3)
(Recall that r0 = 1.)
The stability condition for a dominant police allele is
r1 >
6− p1/2 + 3p1
6 + 2p1
r1/2 (4)
Evolution of policing is highly sensitive to changes in colony efficiency. For example, let
us consider p1/2 = 0.99 and p1 = 1. This means that if half of all workers police then 99%
of all males come from the queen. If all workers police then all males come from the queen.
In this case, efficiency values such as r1/2 = 1.001 and r1 = 1.0031 lead to the evolution of
policing. In principle, arbitrarily small increases in colony efficiency can lead to the evolution
of policing for single mating.
A plot of r1 versus r1/2 for singly mated queens (Figure 6) illustrates the rich behavior
highlighted in Figure 5. Numerical simulations of the evolutionary dynamics are shown in
Figure 7.
Another intriguing feature is that increases in colony efficiency due to policing do not
necessarily result in a higher frequency of police workers at equilibrium. Figure 8 illustrates
this phenomenon. Four possibilities for the efficiency function rz are shown. Notice that
the rz curve which results in coexistence of police workers and non-police workers (blue,
top) is strictly greater than the rz curve which results in all workers policing (green, second
from top). How can increased efficiency due to policing possibly result in policing being
less abundant at equilibrium? If a mutation for non-policing behavior is introduced into
15
(a) (b)
Figure 6: If queens are singly mated (n = 1), then a plot of r1 versus r1/2 clearly shows all
four possibilities for the behavior around the two pure equilibria. For (a), we set p1/2 = 0.75
and p1 = 1. For (b), we set p1/2 = 0.99 and p1 = 1.
a resident policing population, then the evolutionary success of the non-policing mutation
depends on the success of Aa, 0 colonies relative to aa, 1, aa, 0, Aa, 1, and AA, 1 colonies.
Aa, 0 colonies have an efficiency parameter r1/2, while the other four relevant colonies each
have an efficiency parameter r1. Thus, if r1/2 is too large relative to r1, then the non-police
allele can invade a resident policing population, and there is coexistence.
Also notice that the rz curve which results in bistability of police workers and non-police
workers (black, bottom) is strictly less than the rz curve which results in policing being
dominated by non-policing (red, second from bottom). This phenomenon arises in a similar
way: if r1/2 is too small relative to r1, then the non-police allele cannot invade a resident
policing population, and there is bistability.
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Figure 7: Numerical simulations of the evolutionary dynamics of worker policing that show
the four behaviors in Figure 6(a). The policing allele is dominant. For each of the four panels,
we use the initial conditions: (a) XAA,0 = 1− 10−3 and XAA,1 = 10−3; (b) Xaa,1 = 1− 10−3
and Xaa,0 = 10
−3; (c) XAA,0 = 0.02 and XAA,1 = 0.98 (lower curve), and XAA,0 = 0.01 and
XAA,1 = 0.99 (upper curve); (d) XAA,0 = 1 − 10−2 and XAA,1 = 10−2 (lower curve), and
Xaa,1 = 1− 10−2 and Xaa,0 = 10−2 (upper curve). We set r0 = 1 without loss of generality.
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Figure 8: Possible rz efficiency curves for n = 1 mating which demonstrate different be-
haviors. For this plot, we set p1/2 = 0.99 and p1 = 1. Here, each curve has the functional
form rz = 1 + αz + βz
2. For example, we can have: (blue) policing invades but is unstable,
α = 0.003, β = −0.0004; (green) policing invades and is stable, α = 0.0026, β = 0; (red)
policing does not invade and is unstable, α = 0.0024, β = 0; (black) policing does not invade
but is stable, α = 0.002, β = 0.0004.
4. Double mating
For double mating, n = 2, the invasion condition for a dominant police allele is given by
r1/2 > 1 (5)
Thus, policing can invade if there is an infinitesimal increase in colony efficiency when half
of all workers police. Policing cannot invade if there is an infinitesimal decrease in colony
efficiency when half of all workers police.
The stability condition for policing is given by
r1 > r3/4 (6)
Therefore, the policing allele is stable if the colony efficiency is greater for z = 1 (when all
workers police) than for z = 3/4 (when only three quarters of the workers police).
Four possible efficiency curves rz and the corresponding behavior of the police allele are
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Figure 9: Possible rz efficiency curves for n = 2 matings which demonstrate different be-
haviors. Here, each curve has the functional form rz = 1 + αz + βz
2. For example, we can
have: (blue) policing invades but is unstable, α = 0.0005, β = −0.0004; (green) policing
invades and is stable, α = 0.0001, β = 0; (red) policing does not invade and is unstable,
α = −0.0001, β = 0; (black) policing does not invade but is stable, α = −0.0005, β = 0.0004.
shown in Figure 9.
5. Triple mating
For triple mating, n = 3, the invasion condition for a dominant police allele is given by
r1/2 >
4− 2(1− p1/3)r1/3
2 + (p1/3 + p1/2)r1/3
(7)
The stability condition for policing is given by
r1 >
10 + p5/6 + 5p1
10 + 6p1
r5/6 (8)
As a numerical example, let us consider p1/3 = 0.98 and p1/2 = 0.99. If z = 1/3 of
workers police, then 98% of males come from the queen. If z = 1/2 of workers police, then
99% of males come from the queen. In this case, policing cannot invade if r1/3 = 0.9990
and r1/2 = 0.9979. In principle, arbitrarily small reductions in colony efficiency can prevent
evolution of policing for triple mating.
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Figure 10: Possible rz efficiency curves for n = 3 matings which demonstrate different
behaviors. For this plot, we set p1/3 = 0.986, p1/2 = 0.99, p5/6 = 0.996, and p1 = 1. Here,
each curve has the functional form rz = 1 + αz + βz
2. For example, we can have: (blue)
policing invades but is unstable, α = −0.0006, β = −0.0006; (green) policing invades and is
stable, α = −0.0012, β = 0; (red) policing does not invade and is unstable, α = −0.0015,
β = 0; (black) policing does not invade but is stable, α = −0.0021, β = 0.0006. Note that
the value r2/3 affects the population dynamics but does not appear in the conditions for
invasion and stability of the police allele, hence the parentheses on the horizontal axis.
Just as for single mating, we observe the intriguing feature that increases in colony
efficiency due to policing do not necessarily result in a higher frequency of police workers
at equilibrium. Figure 10 illustrates this phenomenon. Four possibilities for the efficiency
function rz are shown. Notice that the rz curve which results in coexistence of police workers
and non-police workers (blue, top) is strictly greater than the rz curve which results in all
workers policing (green, second from top). Also notice that the rz curve which results in
bistability of police workers and non-police workers (black, bottom) is strictly less than the rz
curve which results in policing being dominated by non-policing (red, second from bottom).
6. Recessive police allele
We have also derived the conditions for the emergence and evolutionary stability of
worker policing if the police allele is fully recessive. In this case, AA and Aa workers are
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phenotypically identical and do not police, while aa workers do police. (Alternatively, AA
and Aa workers police with intensity ZAA = ZAa, while aa workers police with intensity
Zaa = ZAA + w = ZAa + w. We consider this case in Section 8.)
Emergence of worker policing
The invasion condition for a recessive police allele, a, is given by
r1/(2n)
r0
>
2(2 + n+ np0)
(2 + n)(2 + p0) + p1/(2n)(n− 2) (9)
Note that Equation (9) for invasion of a recessive police allele has the same mathematical
form as Equation (2) for evolutionary stability of a dominant police allele. Starting from
Equation (2), making the substitution z → 1 − z, and reversing the inequality, we recover
Equation (9). The intuition behind this correspondence is described in Appendix A.
Stability of worker policing
A recessive police allele, a, is evolutionarily stable if(
r1
r(n−1)/n
)[
2
(
r1
r1/2
)
− 1
]
− (1− p(n−1)/n)( r1
r1/2
)
>
p(n−1)/n + p1/2
2
(10)
Note that Equation (10) for evolutionary stability of a recessive police allele has the same
mathematical form as Equation (1) for invasion of a dominant police allele. Starting from
Equation (1), making the substitution z → 1 − z, and reversing the inequality, we recover
Equation (10). Again, the intuition behind this correspondence is described in Appendix A.
Numerical simulations of the evolutionary dynamics with a recessive police allele are
shown in Figure 11.
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Figure 11: Numerical simulations of the evolutionary dynamics of worker policing confirm
the condition given by Equation (9). The policing allele is recessive. For numerically probing
invasion, we use the initial condition XAA,0 = 1 − 10−2 and XAA,1 = 10−2. We set r0 = 1
without loss of generality. Other parameters are: (a) p0 = 0.6, p1/2 = 0.8, and r1 = 1.06; (b)
p0 = 0.35, p1/2 = 0.9, r1/2 = 1.004, and r1 = 1.012.
7. Shape of the efficiency function, rz
The shape of the efficiency function, rz, determines whether policing is more likely to
evolve for single mating or multiple matings. Recall that rz is the colony efficiency (defined
as the rate of generation of reproductives) if a fraction, z, of all workers perform policing.
The variable z can assume values between 0 and 1. If no workers police, z = 0, then the
colony efficiency is at baseline, which we set to one; therefore, we have r0 = 1. Policing can
in principle increase or decrease colony efficiency.
We have the following results regarding the invasion and stability of police workers. We
discuss single (n = 1), double (n = 2), and triple (n = 3) mating. All results apply to
both dominant and recessive police alleles. They can be instantiated with arbitrarily small
changes in colony efficiency.
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Evolutionary invasion of policing
(i) If rz is strictly constant (which is ungeneric), then policing does not invade for single
mating, is neutral for double mating, and does invade for triple mating.
(ii) If rz is monotonically decreasing, then policing either invades not at all or only for
triple mating.
(iii) If rz is monotonically increasing, then policing either invades for single, double, and
triple mating or only for double and triple mating.
(iv) If rz reaches an intermediate maximum (which means colony efficiency is highest
for an intermediate fraction of police workers), then policing can invade for n = 1, 2, 3 or
n = 2, 3 or n = 3 or not at all.
(v) If rz reaches an intermediate minimum (which means colony efficiency is lowest for
an intermediate fraction of police workers), then policing can invade with any pattern of
matings. For example, it is possible that policing invades only for single mating but neither
for double nor triple mating. Or it invades for single and double mating but not for triple
mating.
Evolutionary stability of policing
(i) If rz is constant, then policing is unstable for single mating, is neutral for double
mating, and is stable for triple mating.
(ii) If rz is monotonically decreasing, then policing is unstable for single and double
mating. For triple mating it can be stable or unstable.
(iii) If rz is monotonically increasing, then policing either is always stable or is stable
only for double and triple mating.
(iv) If rz reaches an intermediate maximum, then policing can be stable for any pattern
of matings. For example, policing can be stable for single mating but neither for double nor
triple mating.
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(v) If rz reaches an intermediate minimum, then policing can be stable for n = 1, 2, 3 or
n = 2, 3 or n = 3 or not at all.
Examples for single and double mating
Figure 13 gives some interesting examples for how non-monotonic efficiency functions can
influence the evolution of policing for single (n = 1) and double (n = 2) mating. In order to
discuss the invasion and stability of a dominant police allele for single and double mating,
we need to specify efficiency at three discrete values for the fraction of police workers present
in a colony: r1/2, r3/4, and r1. Note that r0 = 1 is the baseline. Moreover, we need to specify
the fraction of male offspring coming from the queen at two values: p1/2 and p1. For all
examples in Figure 13, we assume p1/2 = 0.99 and p1 = 1. We show four cases: (a) policing
invades for single mating but not for double mating; (b) for both single and double mating,
policing does not invade but is stable; (c) for both single and double mating, policing invades
but is unstable (leading to coexistence of policing and non-policing alleles); (d) policing does
not invade but is stable for single mating; policing invades but is unstable for double mating.
These cases demonstrate the rich behavior of the system, which goes beyond the simple view
that multiple matings are always favorable for the evolution of policing.
8. Gradual evolution of worker policing
Our main calculation applies to mutations of any effect size. In this section, we calculate
the limit of incremental mutation (small mutational effect size). Our calculations in this
section are reminiscent of adaptive dynamics (Nowak and Sigmund, 1990; Hofbauer and
Sigmund, 1990; Dieckmann and Law, 1996; Metz et al., 1996; Geritz et al., 1998), which is
usually formulated for asexual and haploid models. The analysis in this section applies both
to the case of small phenotypic effect and to the case of weak penetrance.
24
Figure 12: Depending on the functional form of colony efficiency, rz, on the fraction of
police workers, z, policing alleles may or may not invade for single, double, or triple mating.
Various possibilities of rz are shown. The outcomes hold both for dominant and recessive
police alleles. If rz is constant, then policing does not invade for single mating, is neutral for
double mating, and invades for triple mating. If rz decreases monotonically, then policing
does not invade or invades only for triple mating. If rz increases monotonically, then policing
either invades only for double and triple mating or for single, double, and triple mating. If
rz reaches a maximum at an intermediate value 0 < z < 1, then policing does not invade or
may invade for triple mating only, for double and triple mating, or for single, double, and
triple mating. If rz reaches a minimum at an intermediate value 0 < z < 1, then any pattern
is possible.
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Figure 13: Non-monotonic efficiency functions can lead to rich and counterintuitive behavior.
We consider invasion and stability of a dominant police allele for single (n = 1) and double
(n = 2) mating. The baseline colony efficiency without policing is r0 = 1. Three other
values must be specified: r1/2, r3/4, and r1. Moreover, we need to specify two values for
how the presence of police workers affects the fraction of male offspring coming from the
queen; we choose p1/2 = 0.99 and p1 = 1. A variety of behaviors can be realized with very
small variation in colony efficiency. (a) Policing invades for single mating but not for double
mating. (b) Policing does not invade but is stable for single and double mating. (c) Policing
invades but is unstable for single and double mating. (d) Policing does not invade but is
stable for single mating, while policing invades but is unstable for double mating.
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Mathematically, we consider the evolutionary dynamics of policing if the phenotypic
mutations induced by the a allele are small. If an allele affecting intensity of policing is
dominant, then it is intuitive to think of wild-type workers as policing with intensity ZAA,
while mutant workers police with intensity ZAa = Zaa = ZAA + w. If an allele affecting
intensity of policing is recessive, then it is intuitive to think of wild-type workers as policing
with intensity ZAA = ZAa, while mutant workers police with intensity Zaa = ZAA + w =
ZAa + w. In the limit of incremental mutation, the fraction, p, of queen-derived males and
the colony efficiency, r, become functions of the average intensity of policing in the colony,
which is Z + wz, where z is the fraction of mutant workers in the colony. We have
pz → P (Z + wz) = P (Z) + P ′(Z)wz + 1
2
P ′′(Z)w2z2 +O(w3)
rz → R(Z + wz) = R(Z) +R′(Z)wz + 1
2
R′′(Z)w2z2 +O(w3)
(11)
We have made the substitutions pz → P (Z + wz) and rz → R(Z + wz), and (11) gives the
Taylor expansions of these quantities in terms of their first and second derivatives at intensity
Z. (For conciseness, we will often omit the argument Z from the functions P and R and their
derivatives.) Here, |w|  1, so that workers with the phenotype corresponding to the mutant
allele only have an incremental effect on colony dynamics. Thus, the expansions (11) are
accurate approximations. We assume that P ′ > 0. The sign of w can be positive or negative.
If w is positive, then the mutant allele’s effect is to increase the intensity of policing. If w is
negative, then the mutant allele’s effect is to decrease the intensity of policing. Note that this
formalism could also be interpreted as describing the case of weak penetrance, in which only
a small fraction of all workers that have the mutant genotype express the mutant phenotype.
For considering the dynamics of a dominant police allele with weak phenotypic mutation,
we introduce the quantity
Cdom =
p1/n + p1/2
2
(
r1/n
r0
)(
r1/2
r0
)
−
[
2−
(
r1/2
r0
)
− (1− p1/n)(r1/n
r0
)]
(12)
If Cdom > 0, then increased intensity of policing is selected, and if Cdom < 0, then increased
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intensity of policing is not selected. This is just a different way of writing (1).
We substitute (11) into (12) and collect powers of w. To first order in w, we get
Cdom = w
[
(n− 2)P ′R + 2(2 + n+ nP )R′
4nR
]
+O(w2) (13)
For considering the dynamics of a recessive police allele with weak phenotypic mutation,
we introduce the quantity
Crec =
r1/(2n)
r0
− 2(2 + n+ np0)
(2 + n)(2 + p0) + p1/(2n)(n− 2) (14)
If Crec > 0, then increased intensity of policing is selected, and if Crec < 0, then increased
intensity of policing is not selected. This is just a different way of writing (9).
We substitute (11) into (14) and collect powers of w. To first order in w, we get
Crec = w
[
(n− 2)P ′R + 2(2 + n+ nP )R′
4nR(2 + n+ nP )
]
+O(w2) (15)
Notice that (13) and (15) are, up to a multiplicative factor, the same to first order in w.
Using Equations (13) and (15), the condition for policing to increase from a given level
Z is
R′(Z)
P ′(Z)
> −(n− 2) R(Z)
2(2 + n+ nP (Z))
(16)
Policing decreases from a given level Z if the opposite inequality holds. We have explicitly
written the Z dependencies in Equation (16) to emphasize that the quantities P , P ′, R, and
R′ are all functions of the intensity of policing, Z.
The left-hand side of Equation (16) can be understood as a ratio of marginal effects. To
be specific, the left-hand side gives the ratio of the marginal change in efficiency over the
marginal increase in the proportion of queen-derived males, if policing were to increase by a
small amount. For selection to favor increased policing, this ratio of marginals must exceed
a quantity depending on the current values of R and P .
Notice that the sign of the right-hand side is determined by n − 2. So we get different
behavior for different numbers of matings:
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• For n = 2 (double mating), policing increases from Z if and only if R′(Z) > 0. This
means that evolution maximizes the value of R, regardless of the behavior of P . In
other words, for double mating, evolution maximizes colony efficiency regardless of the
effect on the number of queen-derived males.
• For n = 1 (single mating), the right-hand side of Equation (16) is positive. So the
condition for Z to increase is more stringent than in the n = 2 case. Increases in
policing may be disfavored even if they increase colony efficiency.
• For n ≥ 3 (triple mating or more than three matings), the right-hand side of Equa-
tion (16) is negative. So the condition for Z to increase is less stringent than in the
n = 2 case. Any increase in policing that improves colony efficiency will be favored,
and even increases in policing that reduce colony efficiency may be favored.
Equations (13) and (15) also allow us to determine the location(s) of evolutionarily sin-
gular strategies (Geritz et al., 1998). Intuitively, a singular strategy is a particular intensity
of policing, denoted by Z∗, at which rare workers with slightly different policing behavior
are, to first order in w, neither favored nor disfavored by natural selection. The parameter
measuring intensity of policing, Z, can take values between 0 (corresponding to no policing)
and 1 (corresponding to full policing). There are several possibilities: There may not exist a
singular strategy for intermediate intensity of policing; in this case, there is either no policing
(Z∗ = 0) or full policing (Z∗ = 1). If there exists a singular strategy for 0 < Z∗ < 1, then
there are additional considerations: There may be convergent evolution toward intensity Z∗
or divergent evolution away from intensity Z∗. In a small neighborhood for which Z ≈ Z∗,
further analysis is needed to determine if the singular strategy corresponding to Z∗ is an
ESS.
To determine the location(s) of evolutionarily singular strategies, we set the quantity in
square brackets that multiplies w in (13) and (15) to zero, yielding
R′(Z∗)
P ′(Z∗)
+ (n− 2) R(Z
∗)
2(2 + n+ nP (Z∗))
= 0 (17)
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Equation (17) gives the location(s) of singular strategies for both dominant and recessive
mutations that affect policing.
For a given singular strategy Z∗, there is convergent evolution toward Z∗ if
d
dZ
[
R′(Z)
P ′(Z)
+ (n− 2) R(Z)
2(2 + n+ nP (Z))
] ∣∣∣∣
Z=Z∗
< 0
There is divergent evolution away from Z∗ if the opposite inequality holds.
It is helpful to consider some examples. If the functions P (Z) and R(Z) are known for a
given species, then the behavior of worker policing with gradual evolution can be studied. It
is possible that policing is at maximal intensity, Z∗ = 1 (Figure 14(a)), is nonexistent, Z∗ = 0
(Figure 14(b)), is bistable around a critical value of intensity, 0 < Z∗ < 1 (Figure 14(c)), or
exists at an intermediate value of intensity, 0 < Z∗ < 1 (Figure 14(d)).
Note that a singular strategy may or may not be an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS).
(For example, it is possible that there is convergent evolution toward a particular singular
strategy Z∗ which is not an ESS. In this case, once Z ≈ Z∗, evolutionary branching may
occur; Geritz et al., 1998) To determine if (17) is an ESS, we must look at second-order
terms in (12) and (14).
For a dominant police allele, we return to (12) with the substitutions (11). We focus on
a singular strategy given by (17). For a singular strategy, Cdom is zero to first order in w.
To second order in w, we get
Cdom = w
2
[
(n2 − 4)P ′′R2 + 2(n2 + 4n− 4)P ′R′R
16n2R2
+
8nPR′2 + 2(n2 + n2P + 4)R′′R
16n2R2
]
+O(w3)
(18)
We may alternatively write (18) by substituting for R′ using (17):
Cdom = w
2
[
(2 + n+ nP )2[(n2 − 4)P ′′R + 2(n2 + n2P + 4)R′′]
16n2R(2 + n+ nP )2
−(n
2 − 4)(n2 + n2P + 4n− 4)P ′2R
16n2R(2 + n+ nP )2
]
+O(w3)
(19)
For a recessive police allele, we return to (14) with the substitutions (11). We focus on
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Figure 14: Several simple examples of functions P (Z) and R(Z) are shown. For single
mating, the corresponding dynamics of policing intensity with gradual evolution are also
shown. We use the forms P (Z) = 1 − P ′ + P ′Z and R(Z) = 1 + C1Z + (1/2)C2Z2. For
each of the four panels, we set: (a) P ′ = 0.5, C1 = 0.2, C2 = 0, corresponding to Z∗ = 1;
(b) P ′ = 0.8, C1 = 0.1, C2 = 0, corresponding to Z∗ = 0; (c) P ′ = 0.8, C1 = 0.12,
C2 = 0, corresponding to bistability around Z
∗ = 1/3; (d) P ′ = 0.4, C1 = 0.2, C2 = −0.18,
corresponding to an intermediate level of policing around Z∗ ≈ 0.7986 . . ..
31
a singular strategy given by (17). For a singular strategy, Crec is zero to first order in w. To
second order in w, we get
Crec = w
2
[
(n− 2)(2 + n+ nP )P ′′R− (n− 2)2P ′2R
16n2R(2 + n+ nP )2
+
2(2 + n+ nP )2R′′
16n2R(2 + n+ nP )2
]
+O(w3)
(20)
Inspection of (18) and (20) allows us to determine if a singular strategy is an ESS. If the
bracketed quantity multiplying w2 is negative, then mutations that change policing in either
direction are disfavored. If the bracketed quantity multiplying w2 is positive, then mutations
that change policing in either direction are favored. Thus, for a dominant allele that affects
intensity of policing, the singular strategy (17) represents a local ESS if
(n2 − 4)P ′′R2 + 2(n2 + 4n− 4)P ′R′R + 8nPR′2 + 2(n2 + n2P + 4)R′′R < 0 (21)
We may alternatively write (21) by substituting for R′ using (17):
(2+n+nP )2[(n2−4)P ′′R+2(n2 +n2P +4)R′′]− (n2−4)(n2 +n2P +4n−4)P ′2R < 0 (22)
Similarly, for a recessive allele that affects intensity of policing, the singular strategy (17)
represents a local ESS if
(n− 2)(2 + n+ nP )P ′′R− (n− 2)2P ′2R + 2(2 + n+ nP )2R′′ < 0 (23)
Here, P , P ′, P ′′, R, R′, and R′′ are all functions of the intensity of policing, Z. The local
ESS conditions (22) and (23) are quite opaque and do not allow for simple analysis. Notice
that, although the locations of evolutionarily singular strategies are the same for dominant
and recessive mutations that influence policing, the conditions for a singular strategy to be
a local ESS are different.
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9. Policing and inclusive fitness theory
It has been claimed that policing is a test case of inclusive fitness theory (Abbot et al.,
2011). But the first two papers to theoretically establish the phenomenon (Woyciechowski
and Lomnicki, 1987; Ratnieks, 1988) use standard population genetics; they do not mention
the term “inclusive fitness”, and they do not calculate inclusive fitness. Therefore, the claims
that theoretical investigations of worker policing emerge from inclusive fitness theory or that
empirical studies of policing test predictions of inclusive fitness theory are incorrect.
In light of known and mathematically proven limitations of inclusive fitness theory
(Nowak et al., 2010; Allen et al., 2013), it is unlikely that inclusive fitness theory can be used
to study general questions of worker policing. Inclusive fitness theory assumes that each
individual contributes a separate, well-defined portion of fitness to itself and to every other
individual. It has been shown repeatedly (Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman, 1978; Uyenoyama
and Feldman, 1982; Matessi and Karlin, 1984; Nowak et al., 2010; van Veelen et al., 2014),
that this assumption does not hold for general evolutionary processes. Therefore, inclusive
fitness is a limited concept that does not exist in most biological situations.
Our work shows that the evolution of worker policing depends on the effectiveness of
egg removal (pz) and the consequences of colony efficiency (rz). Each of these effects can
be nonlinear (not the sum of contributions from separate individuals), with important con-
sequences for the fate of a policing allele. Moreover, the invasion and stability conditions
involve the product of p- and r-values, indicating a nontrivial interaction between these two
effects which does not reduce to a simple sum of costs and benefits. We also found that there
are separate conditions for invasion and stability, with neither implying the other. Inclusive
fitness theory, which posits a single, linear condition for the success of a trait, is not equipped
to deal with these considerations.
Attempts to extend inclusive fitness theory to more general evolutionary processes (Queller,
1992; Frank, 1998; Gardner et al., 2011) rely on the incorrect interpretation of linear re-
gression coefficients (Allen et al., 2013; see also Birch and Okasha, 2014). This misuse of
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statistical inference tools is unique to inclusive fitness theory, and differs from legitimate uses
of linear regression in quantitative genetics and other areas of science. It was also recently
discovered that even in situations where inclusive fitness does exist, it can give the wrong
result as to the direction of natural selection (Tarnita and Taylor, 2014).
Relatedness-based arguments are often seen in conjunction with inclusive fitness, but
there is a crucial difference. Consider the following statement: if the queen is singly mated,
then workers share more genetic material with sons of other workers than with sons of
the queen. This statement is not wrong and could be useful in formulating evolutionary
hypotheses. Such hypotheses can then be checked using exact mathematical methods.
The problem arises when one attempts to formulate the quantity of inclusive fitness
by partitioning fitness into contributions from different individuals and reassigning these
contributions from recipient to actor. A worker does not make separate contributions to
fitnesses of others, and therefore does not have “inclusive fitness”. Arguments such as “the
worker maximizes her inclusive fitness by not policing” are meaningless, since they are based
on maximizing a nonexistent quantity. Moreover, even when evolution leads individuals
to maximize some quantity, that quantity is not necessarily inclusive fitness (Okasha and
Martens, 2015; Lehmann et al., 2015).
It is true that genes (alleles) can be favored by natural selection if they enhance the
reproduction of copies of themselves in other individuals. But that argument works out on
the level of genes and can be fully analyzed using population genetics. Inclusive fitness only
arises when the individual is chosen as the level of analysis, which is a problematic choice
for many cases of complex family or population structure (Akcay and Van Cleve, 2016).
Bourke (2011) has proposed that inclusive fitness remains valid as a concept even when
it is nonexistent as a quantity. But why is such an uninstantiable concept useful? The
mathematical theory of evolution is clear and powerful. Exact calculations of evolutionary
dynamics (Antal et al., 2009; Allen and Nowak, 2014; Fu et al., 2014; Hauert and Doebeli,
2004; Szabo and Fath, 2007; Antal and Scheuring, 2006; Traulsen et al., 2008; van Veelen
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et al., 2014; Simon et al., 2013) demonstrate that inclusive fitness is not needed for un-
derstanding any phenomenon in evolutionary biology. This realization is good news for all
whose primary goal is to understand evolution rather than to insist on a particular method
of analysis. By releasing ourselves from the confines of a mathematically limited theory, we
expand the possibilities of scientific discovery.
10. Discussion
We have derived analytical conditions for the invasion and stability of policing in situa-
tions where queens mate once or several times and where colony efficiency can be affected
by policing. In the special case where policing has no effect on colony efficiency, our results
confirm the traditional view that policing does not evolve for single mating, is neutral for
double mating, and does evolve for triple mating or more than three matings. If colony
efficiency depends linearly or monotonically on the fraction of workers that are policing,
then our results support the view that multiple mating is favorable to evolution of policing
(Ratnieks, 1988). Our results also show that non-monotonic relations in colony dynamics
and small changes in colony efficiency necessitate a more careful analysis.
We find that policing can evolve in species with singly mated queens if it causes minute
increases in colony efficiency. We find that policing does not evolve in species with multiply
mated queens if it causes minute decreases in colony efficiency. For non-monotonic efficiency
functions, it is possible that single mating allows evolution of policing, while multiple mating
opposes evolution of policing.
Our analysis is the first to give precise conditions for both the invasion and stability
of policing for both dominant and recessive mutations that effect policing. We study the
evolutionary invasion and evolutionary stability of policing both analytically and numerically.
For any number of matings, there are four possible outcomes (see Figure 5): (i) policing can
invade and is stable; (ii) policing can invade but is unstable, leading to coexistence; (iii)
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policing cannot invade but is stable, leading to bistability; (iv) policing cannot invade and is
unstable. We give precise conditions for all outcomes for both dominant and recessive police
alleles. All outcomes can be achieved with arbitrarily small changes in colony efficiency.
Our calculations are not based on any assumption about the strength of phenotypic
mutation induced by an allele. The conditions (1), (2), (9), and (10) also describe the
dynamics of mutations that have an arbitrarily small phenotypic effect on colony dynamics.
This facilitates investigation of the evolution of complex social behaviors that result from
gradual accumulation of many mutations (Kapheim et al., 2015). We derive a simple relation,
Equation (17), for the location(s) of evolutionarily singular strategies. We also derive precise
conditions for a singular strategy to be an ESS. These results are applicable for understanding
both the case of weak phenotypic effect and the case of weak penetrance.
Our analysis does not use inclusive fitness theory. Given the known limitations of inclusive
fitness (Nowak et al., 2010; Allen et al., 2013), it is unlikely that inclusive fitness theory could
provide a general framework for analyzing the evolution of worker policing.
In summary, the main conclusions of our paper are: (i) The prevalent relatedness-based
argument that policing evolves under multiple mating but not under single mating is not
robust with respect to arbitrarily small variations in colony efficiency; (ii) For non-monotonic
efficiency functions, it is possible that policing evolves for single mating, but not for double
or triple mating; (iii) Careful measurements of colony efficiency and the fraction of queen-
derived males are needed to understand how natural selection acts on policing; (iv) Contrary
to what has been claimed (Abbot et al., 2011), the phenomenon of worker policing is no em-
pirical confirmation of inclusive fitness theory; the first two mathematical papers on worker
policing (Woyciechowski and Lomnicki, 1987; Ratnieks, 1988) do not use inclusive fitness
theory. The present paper, which also does not use inclusive fitness theory, is the first de-
tailed analysis of policing for any number of matings and taking into account effects on
colony efficiency.
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Appendix A. Stability Analysis
In this Supplementary Information, we introduce a population genetics-based model for
insect dynamics in the Hymenoptera, and we calculate precise conditions that must be
satisfied if worker policing is to evolve. Our model is consistent with haplodiploid genetics.
We postulate that a specific locus is responsible for worker policing. The A allele is wild-type,
while the mutant a allele leads to unmated females killing the male eggs of other unmated
females. If the a allele is dominant, then workers that have at least one a allele kill other
workers’ male eggs. If the a allele is recessive, then workers that are homozygous in the a
allele kill other workers’ male eggs. What conditions on the colony parameters are sufficient
for worker policing to arise and be established in a population? The mathematical analysis
is similar to that in Olejarz et al. (2015). The calculations for both dominant and recessive
alleles affecting policing are presented below.
Description of the Model
We study a population of insects that follows haplodiploid genetics, in which females
have homologous pairs of maternal and paternal chromosomes, and males have a single set
of chromosomes. A queen produces female workers and gynes (future queens) from her own
genotype and using sperm from the male drones that she has mated with. A queen also
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produces drones. Female workers, though unfertilized, lay male eggs as well. Each colony
produces many offspring, and the population is made of many colonies.
We investigate the dynamics of two alleles, A and a, that enable us to study the evolu-
tionary emergence and stability of worker policing—i.e., the eating of worker-laid male eggs
by workers. The A allele generates a phenotype such that a worker does not police (or that
policing occurs with intensity Z). The a allele generates a phenotype such that a worker
performs policing (or that policing occurs with intensity Z + w).
Our analysis of the invasion of police workers is general and open to multiple interpreta-
tions. For example, we have thus far considered that wild-type workers perform no policing,
while workers carrying the mutant allele police. In this view, p0 represents the fraction of
male eggs that originate from the queen when no workers are policing, while pz > p0 rep-
resents the fraction of male eggs that originate from the queen when a fraction z > 0 of
workers are policing. We may instead consider the case where all workers are policing and
view our parameter z as representing the intensity of policing. It is possible that wild-type
workers perform policing with intensity Z, while mutant workers perform policing with in-
creased intensity Z + w > Z. In this alternative view, p0 represents the fraction of male
eggs that originate from the queen when all workers police with intensity Z, while pz > p0
represents the fraction of male eggs that originate from the queen when a fraction z > 0 of
workers police with intensity Z+w, while the remaining fraction 1−z of workers police with
intensity Z. Regardless of interpretation, only changes in the resulting function pz, which
measures the fraction of male eggs that originate from the queen as a function of the fraction
of mutant workers in the colony, affect the condition for invasion of worker policing in our
model. Of course, there may be biological differences between adding more police workers or
simply increasing the intensity at which existing workers police, but such biological differ-
ences would be studied by adding parameters to our model. To keep the presentation here as
simple as possible, we will reserve such biological subtleties for study in a future publication.
The parameter n is the number of males with which the colony’s queen has mated. An
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illustration of the mating events is shown in Figure 1(a). There are several possibilities: A
type AA gyne mates with n−m type A males and m type a males. A type Aa gyne mates
with n −m type A males and m type a males. A type aa gyne mates with n −m type A
males and m type a males.
A reproductive female (queen) mates with n randomly chosen males in the population.
For mating, the gynes and drones are well-mixed: If a gyne from one colony mates with
n drones, then each of the n drones is chosen randomly from among the colonies in the
population.
The selection dynamics in continuous time are described by a simple system of differential
equations:
X˙AA,m =
dXAA,m
dt
=
(
n
m
)
xAAy
n−m
A y
m
a − φXAA,m
X˙Aa,m =
dXAa,m
dt
=
(
n
m
)
xAay
n−m
A y
m
a − φXAa,m
X˙aa,m =
dXaa,m
dt
=
(
n
m
)
xaay
n−m
A y
m
a − φXaa,m
(A.1)
(In what follows, we use the overdot notation to denote the time derivative, d/dt.)
We make sense of Eqs. (A.1) as follows. Each queen has one of three possible combina-
tions of the A and a alleles in her own genotype; she can have type AA, type Aa, or type
aa. Each queen also has sperm stored from her matings, and m represents the number of
mutant males (type a males) that a queen has mated with. Since each colony is headed by a
single queen, the variables XAA,m, XAa,m, and Xaa,m can be used to refer to either a colony
or to the queen that heads the colony; either intuition is acceptable. The number of colonies
with a type AA queen who has mated with n−m type A males and m type a males is repre-
sented by XAA,m. The number of colonies with a type Aa queen who has mated with n−m
type A males and m type a males is represented by XAa,m. The number of colonies with a
type aa queen who has mated with n−m type A males and m type a males is represented
by Xaa,m. xAA, xAa, and xaa represent the numbers of gynes (reproductive females) in the
population with the three possible genotypes. yA and ya represent the numbers of drones in
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the population with the two possible genotypes. A gyne mates randomly with n −m type
A males and m type a males in the population (i.e.; the population is well-mixed in terms
of mating). The binomial coefficient measures all possible ways in which a gyne can mate
with m males of type a out of n total matings.
Due to environmental factors, the total number of colonies is constant (with value c) at
all times:
n∑
m=0
(XAA,m +XAa,m +Xaa,m) = c (A.2)
Since environmental resources that are necessary for colonies to thrive are limited, the re-
quirement that the total number of colonies is constant in time is biologically justifiable.
Consequently, φ in Eqs. (A.1) represents a density-dependent colony death rate, and we use
φ to model the limiting effects of environmental constraints on the total number of colonies.
To maintain the density constraint, Eq. (A.2), on the colony variables, we choose φ to equal
φ = c−1(xAA + xAa + xaa)(yA + ya)n (A.3)
We acknowledge that there may be different ways to perform the calculations that follow.
We feel that working in continuous time is easiest and simplifies the analysis. When calcu-
lations must be performed to second order in a perturbation (for example, when considering
the invasion of a recessive police allele or the stability of a dominant police allele), working
in continuous time is quite convenient.
We now introduce the biological parameters of our model. The appearance of police
workers affects the fraction of male eggs in a colony that come from the queen. If a fraction
z of workers in a colony are policing, then the fraction of male offspring that come from
the queen is denoted by pz. The form of the quantity pz for 0 ≤ z ≤ 1 is likely species-
dependent. However, it is reasonable to expect that pz is an increasing function of z, because
an increase in the proportion of workers that are policing results in a larger proportion of
queen-produced males.
Equally important is the efficiency, rz, of a colony in which a fraction z of workers
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are policing. Intuitively, the parameter rz is the total number of offspring produced by
a colony when a fraction z of workers in the colony are policing. The most important
point conceptually is that the ratios of colony efficiency values, rz, for colonies with different
genotypes—i.e., the relative reproductive efficiencies of colonies with different genotypes—are
the important quantities for understanding the evolutionary emergence of worker policing.
It is helpful to rewrite everything in Eqs. (A.1) in terms of the colony variables, XAA,m,
XAa,m, and Xaa,m. Specifically, we must rewrite the first terms on the right-hand sides of
Eqs. (A.1) in terms of the colony variables. We express each of the gyne and drone numbers,
xAA, xAa, xaa, yA, and ya, as a simple linear sum of the colony variables, XAA,m, XAa,m, and
Xaa,m. In these linear relationships, the coefficients depend on whether the allele, a, acting
in a worker to induce that worker’s policing behavior is dominant or recessive.
Reproductives of Each Type of Colony
For each colony following haplodiploid genetics, and with single mating of each queen, we
have the reproduction events shown in Figure 1(b). For each colony following haplodiploid
genetics, and with n matings of each queen (with n ≥ 1), we have the reproduction events
shown in Figure 1(c).
Figure 1(c) can be interpreted as follows.
Consider the individuals produced by type AA,m colonies. The queen makes n−m type
AA females for every m type Aa females that she makes. Because the queen only has the A
allele, she can only make type A drones. A fraction (n−m)/n of all workers make only type
A males, and a fraction m/n of all workers make type A males and type a males in equal
numbers. In all, workers make 2n−m type A males for every m type a males.
Consider the individuals produced by type Aa,m colonies. The queen makes n−m type
AA females, n type Aa females, and m type aa females out of every 2n females that she
makes. Since the queen carries the A and a alleles, she makes type A drones and type a
drones in equal numbers. A fraction (n −m)/(2n) of all workers make only type A males,
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a fraction 1/2 of all workers make type A males and type a males in equal numbers, and a
fraction m/(2n) of all workers make only type a males. In all, workers make 3n− 2m type
A males for every n+ 2m type a males.
Consider the individuals produced by type aa,m colonies. The queen makes n−m type
Aa females for every m type aa females that she makes. Because the queen only has the a
allele, she can only make type a drones. A fraction (n −m)/n of all workers make type A
males and type a males in equal numbers, and a fraction m/n of all workers make only type
a males. In all, workers make n−m type A males for every n+m type a males.
We do not consider stochastic effects here because the number of individuals produced
by a colony is assumed to be very large. Thus, the fractions of colony offspring with each
possible genotype is always exactly the same for that type of colony.
Reproductives with a Dominant Policing Allele
We focus on the evolution of the 3(n+ 1) colony variables. An important step is to write
all quantities in terms of the colony variables. Each type of reproductive of a colony (xAA,
xAa, xaa, yA, and ya) can be written as a simple weighted sum of colony variables. From
looking at Figure 1(c), the numbers of unfertilized females (xAA, xAa, and xaa) and males (yA
and ya) in the population which are reproductive (i.e., capable of mating) can be expressed
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as:
xAA =
n∑
m=0
[
n−m
n
grm
n
XAA,m +
n−m
2n
grm+n
2n
XAa,m
]
xAa =
n∑
m=0
[
m
n
grm
n
XAA,m +
1
2
grm+n
2n
XAa,m +
n−m
n
gr1Xaa,m
]
xaa =
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m=0
[m
2n
grm+n
2n
XAa,m +
m
n
gr1Xaa,m
]
yA =
n∑
m=0
[
2n−m+mpm
n
2n
krm
n
XAA,m +
3n− 2m+ (2m− n)pm+n
2n
4n
krm+n
2n
XAa,m
+
(n−m)(1− p1)
2n
kr1Xaa,m
]
ya =
n∑
m=0
[
m
(
1− pm
n
)
2n
krm
n
XAA,m +
2m+ n+ (n− 2m)pm+n
2n
4n
krm+n
2n
XAa,m
+
n+m+ (n−m)p1
2n
kr1Xaa,m
]
(A.4)
0 < g ≤ 1 is the fraction of all females that are gynes. Likewise, 0 < k ≤ 1 is the fraction
of all males that are able to mate. For instance, we might expect that g  1 and k  1,
which means that only a small amount of the total number of males and females produced
by each colony are capable of dispersing, mating, and starting new colonies. We explicitly
write the parameters g and k here for conceptual clarity; they end up being irrelevant in the
conditions for invasion and stability of police workers.
Reproductives with a Recessive Policing Allele
We focus on the evolution of the 3(n+ 1) colony variables. An important step is to write
all quantities in terms of the colony variables. Each type of reproductive of a colony (xAA,
xAa, xaa, yA, and ya) can be written as a simple weighted sum of colony variables. From
looking at Figure 1(c), the numbers of unfertilized females (xAA, xAa, and xaa) and males (yA
and ya) in the population which are reproductive (i.e., capable of mating) can be expressed
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as:
xAA =
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(A.5)
0 < g ≤ 1 is the fraction of all females that are gynes. Likewise, 0 < k ≤ 1 is the fraction
of all males that are able to mate. For instance, we might expect that g  1 and k  1,
which means that only a small amount of the total number of males and females produced
by each colony are capable of dispersing, mating, and starting new colonies. We explicitly
write the parameters g and k here for conceptual clarity; they end up being irrelevant in the
conditions for invasion and stability of police workers.
Rescaling of the Model Variables
We have presented the biological intuition for our mathematical model that describes the
population genetics of Hymenopteran insect colonies. For the calculations of evolutionary
dynamics of worker policing that follow, it is mathematically convenient to make the following
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substitutions:
XAA,m → cXAA,m
XAa,m → cXAa,m
Xaa,m → cXaa,m
xAA → gcxAA
xAa → gcxAa
xaa → gcxaa
yA → kcyA
ya → kcya
φ→ gkncnφ
t→ g−1k−nc−nt
(A.6)
Rescaling the model variables and parameters according to Eqs. (A.6) leads to simplifications
in the mathematics. We substitute Eqs. (A.6) into Eqs. (A.1) and get
X˙AA,m =
dXAA,m
dt
=
(
n
m
)
xAAy
n−m
A y
m
a − φXAA,m
X˙Aa,m =
dXAa,m
dt
=
(
n
m
)
xAay
n−m
A y
m
a − φXAa,m
X˙aa,m =
dXaa,m
dt
=
(
n
m
)
xaay
n−m
A y
m
a − φXaa,m
(A.7)
We substitute Eqs. (A.6) into Eq. (A.2) and get
n∑
m=0
(XAA,m +XAa,m +Xaa,m) = 1 (A.8)
We substitute Eqs. (A.6) into Eq. (A.3) and get
φ = (xAA + xAa + xaa)(yA + ya)
n (A.9)
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Reproductives (Rescaled) with a Dominant Policing Allele
We substitute Eqs. (A.6) into Eqs. (A.4) and get
xAA =
n∑
m=0
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n−m
n
rm
n
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n−m
2n
rm+n
2n
XAa,m
]
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]
yA =
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m=0
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n
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3n− 2m+ (2m− n)pm+n
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]
ya =
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(
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n
)
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2n
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+
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2n
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]
(A.10)
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Reproductives (Rescaled) with a Recessive Policing Allele
We substitute Eqs. (A.6) into Eqs. (A.5) and get
xAA =
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+
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]
(A.11)
Differences Between Our Model of Policing and the Model in Olejarz et al. (2015)
A key point distinguishes our model of policing from the model of non-reproductive
workers presented in Olejarz et al. (2015). In our model of policing, mutant workers lay
male eggs. In the model of non-reproductive workers in Olejarz et al. (2015), mutant workers
do not lay male eggs. Therefore, the “Workers’ Sons” column in Figure 1(c) differs from the
“Workers’ Sons” column in Figure 1(b,c) of Olejarz et al. (2015). Consequently, yA and ya
of Eqs. (A.10) differ from yA and ya of Eqs. (14) in Olejarz et al. (2015). Also, yA and ya
of Eqs. (A.11) differ from yA and ya of Eqs. (15) in Olejarz et al. (2015).
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Conditions for Evolutionary Invasion and Evolutionary Stability of Worker Polic-
ing: Perturbative Analysis
After rescaling the model variables and parameters according to Eqs. (A.6), the evolu-
tionary dynamics are mathematically unchanged: Eqs. (A.1) are identical in form to Eqs.
(A.7), Eq. (A.2) is identical in form to Eq. (A.8), Eq. (A.3) is identical in form to Eq.
(A.9), Eqs. (A.4) are identical in form to Eqs. (A.10), and Eqs. (A.5) are identical in
form to Eqs. (A.11). But the rescalings (A.6) are helpful in doing calculations. Notice that
when the right-hand sides of (A.7) are expressed in terms of the colony frequency variables
XAA,m, XAa,m, and Xaa,m, the parameters g, k, and c, which are not necessary for under-
standing the evolutionary invasion or evolutionary stability of police workers, disappear from
the calculations. This simplifies presentation and clarity in the calculations that follow.
To begin, notice that our model admits only two pure equilibria:
• XAA,0 = 1 with all other colony variables equal to zero. In this case, the a allele is
absent from every individual in the population.
• Xaa,n = 1 with all other colony variables equal to zero. In this case, the A allele is
absent from every individual in the population.
As seen from Eqs. (A.7), if any mixed equilibria exist, then they will correspond to all
3(n+ 1) colony frequency variables being nonzero.
Appendix A.1. Invasion of a Dominant Worker Policing Allele
We start with an infinitesimal quantity of the mutant allele, a, and we perturb the
XAA,0 = 1 pure equilibrium: XAA,0 → 1 − δ(1)AA,0? Does a dominant worker policing allele
spread in the population, or is it eliminated?
There are a total of 3n + 3 types of colonies, and with the density constraint, there are
3n+2 independent colony variables. However, the calculation simplifies. If the perturbation
is small (i.e. if   1), then only three colony types, AA, 0, AA, 1, and Aa, 0, determine
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whether or not the dominant worker policing allele invades. Any other colony type has a
queen that contains at least two mutant a alleles (from her own genotype combined with the
sperm she has stored), but such queens are so rare that they are negligible. The relevant
equations among (A.7) for understanding invasion of a dominant police allele are
X˙AA,0 = xAAy
n
A − φXAA,0
X˙AA,1 = nxAAy
n−1
A ya − φXAA,1
X˙Aa,0 = xAay
n
A − φXAa,0
(A.12)
Formally keeping track of powers of , and neglecting higher-order terms, we have:
XAA,0 = 1 −δ(1)AA,0 −O(2)
XAA,1 = +δ
(1)
AA,1 +O(2)
XAa,0 = +δ
(1)
Aa,0 +O(2)
(A.13)
We must simplify the density constraint (A.8). We substitute (A.13) into (A.8) and collect
powers of . We get
δ
(1)
AA,0 = δ
(1)
AA,1 + δ
(1)
Aa,0 (A.14)
Next, we substitute (A.13) into (A.10), substituting the density constraint (A.14) and keeping
track of terms only up to order :
xAA = r0 + 
[
(n− 1)r 1
n
− nr0
n
δ
(1)
AA,1 +
−2r0 + r 1
2
2
δ
(1)
Aa,0
]
+O(2)
xAa = 
[
r 1
n
n
δ
(1)
AA,1 +
r 1
2
2
δ
(1)
Aa,0
]
+O(2)
yA = r0 + 
−2nr0 −
(
1− 2n− p 1
n
)
r 1
n
2n
δ
(1)
AA,1 +
−4r0 +
(
3− p 1
2
)
r 1
2
4
δ
(1)
Aa,0
+O(2)
ya = 
[
1− p 1
n
2n
r 1
n
δ
(1)
AA,1 +
1 + p 1
2
4
r 1
2
δ
(1)
Aa,0
]
+O(2)
(A.15)
By substituting (A.15) and (A.13) into (A.12), using the density constraint (A.14), and
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collecting powers of , we find
δ˙
(1)
AA,1 =
−2rn+10 +
(
1− p 1
n
)
r 1
n
rn0
2
δ
(1)
AA,1 +
n
(
1 + p 1
2
)
r 1
2
rn0
4
δ
(1)
Aa,0
δ˙
(1)
Aa,0 =
r 1
n
rn0
n
δ
(1)
AA,1 +
−2rn+10 + r 1
2
rn0
2
δ
(1)
Aa,0
The equations for δ˙
(1)
AA,1 and δ˙
(1)
Aa,0 can be written in matrix form asδ˙(1)AA,1
δ˙
(1)
Aa,0
 =
−2r
n+1
0 +
(
1−p 1
n
)
r 1
n
rn0
2
n
(
1+p 1
2
)
r 1
2
rn0
4
r 1
n
rn0
n
−2rn+10 +r 1
2
rn0
2

δ(1)AA,1
δ
(1)
Aa,0

Setting the dominant eigenvalue to be greater than zero and simplifying, we find that the
dominant allele for worker policing increases in frequency if
p 1
n
+ p 1
2
2
(
r 1
n
r0
)(
r 1
2
r0
)
> 2−
(
r 1
2
r0
)
−
(
1− p 1
n
)(r 1
n
r0
)
(A.16)
Appendix A.2. Invasion of a Recessive Worker Policing Allele
We start with an infinitesimal quantity of the mutant allele, a, and we perturb the
XAA,0 = 1 pure equilibrium: XAA,0 → 1 − δ(1)AA,0? Does a recessive worker policing allele
spread in the population, or is it eliminated?
There are a total of 3n + 3 types of colonies, and with the density constraint, there
are 3n + 2 independent colony variables. However, the calculation again simplifies. If the
perturbation is small (i.e. if  1), then only six colony types, AA, 0, AA, 1, Aa, 0, AA, 2,
Aa, 1, and aa, 0, determine whether or not the recessive worker policing allele invades. Any
other colony type has a queen that contains at least three mutant a alleles (from her own
genotype combined with the sperm she has stored), but such queens are so rare that they
are negligible. The relevant equations among (A.7) for understanding invasion of a recessive
50
police allele are
X˙AA,0 = xAAy
n
A − φXAA,0
X˙AA,1 = nxAAy
n−1
A ya − φXAA,1
X˙Aa,0 = xAay
n
A − φXAa,0
X˙AA,2 =
n(n− 1)
2
xAAy
n−2
A y
2
a − φXAA,2
X˙Aa,1 = nxAay
n−1
A ya − φXAa,1
X˙aa,0 = xaay
n
A − φXaa,0
(A.17)
Recall that for investigation of the dominant allele, it was only necessary to consider terms
of order  to obtain conditions for invasion of the mutant allele. For analysis of the recessive
allele, terms of order  do not provide all information needed for determining if the allele
invades, making the calculation more involved. Formally keeping track of powers of  and
2, and neglecting higher-order terms, we have:
XAA,0 = 1 −δ(1)AA,0 − 2δ(2)AA,0 −O(3)
XAA,1 = +δ
(1)
AA,1 + 
2δ
(2)
AA,1 +O(3)
XAa,0 = +δ
(1)
Aa,0 + 
2δ
(2)
Aa,0 +O(3)
XAA,2 = + 
2δ
(2)
AA,2 +O(3)
XAa,1 = + 
2δ
(2)
Aa,1 +O(3)
Xaa,0 = + 
2δ
(2)
aa,0 +O(3)
(A.18)
The simplified density constraint, Eq. (A.14), holds for the cases of dominant and recessive
police alleles. We must further simplify the density constraint (A.8) for the case of a recessive
police allele. We substitute (A.18) into (A.8) and collect powers of 2. We get
δ
(2)
AA,0 = δ
(2)
AA,1 + δ
(2)
Aa,0 + δ
(2)
AA,2 + δ
(2)
Aa,1 + δ
(2)
aa,0 (A.19)
Next, we substitute (A.18) into (A.11), substituting the density constraints (A.14) and (A.19)
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and keeping track of terms up to order 2:
xAAr
−1
0 = 1 + 
[−1
n
δ
(1)
AA,1 −
1
2
δ
(1)
Aa,0
]
+ 2
[−1
n
δ
(2)
AA,1 −
1
2
δ
(2)
Aa,0
− 2
n
δ
(2)
AA,2 +
−2n+ (n− 1)r 1
2n
r−10
2n
δ
(2)
Aa,1 − δ(2)aa,0
]
+O(3)
xAar
−1
0 = 
[
1
n
δ
(1)
AA,1 +
1
2
δ
(1)
Aa,0
]
+ 2
[
1
n
δ
(2)
AA,1 +
1
2
δ
(2)
Aa,0
+
2
n
δ
(2)
AA,2 +
r 1
2n
r−10
2
δ
(2)
Aa,1 + δ
(2)
aa,0
]
+O(3)
xaar
−1
0 = 
2
[
r 1
2n
r−10
2n
δ
(2)
Aa,1
]
+O(3)
yAr
−1
0 = 1 + 
[
−1− p0
2n
δ
(1)
AA,1 −
1 + p0
4
δ
(1)
Aa,0
]
+ 2
[
−1− p0
2n
δ
(2)
AA,1 −
1 + p0
4
δ
(2)
Aa,0
−1− p0
n
δ
(2)
AA,2 +
−4n+
(
3n− 2− (n− 2)p 1
2n
)
r 1
2n
r−10
4n
δ
(2)
Aa,1
−1 + p0
2
δ
(2)
aa,0
]
+O(3)
yar
−1
0 = 
[
1− p0
2n
δ
(1)
AA,1 +
1 + p0
4
δ
(1)
Aa,0
]
+ 2
[
1− p0
2n
δ
(2)
AA,1 +
1 + p0
4
δ
(2)
Aa,0
+
1− p0
n
δ
(2)
AA,2 +
(
n+ 2 + (n− 2)p 1
2n
)
r 1
2n
r−10
4n
δ
(2)
Aa,1
+
1 + p0
2
δ
(2)
aa,0
]
+O(3)
(A.20)
By substituting (A.20) and (A.18) into (A.17), using the density constraint (A.14), and
collecting powers of , we find
δ˙
(1)
AA,1 =
−(1 + p0)
2
rn+10 δ
(1)
AA,1 +
n(1 + p0)
4
rn+10 δ
(1)
Aa,0
δ˙
(1)
Aa,0 =
1
n
rn+10 δ
(1)
AA,1 −
1
2
rn+10 δ
(1)
Aa,0
The equations for δ˙
(1)
AA,1 and δ˙
(1)
Aa,0 can be written in matrix form asδ˙(1)AA,1
δ˙
(1)
Aa,0
 = rn+10
−(1+p0)2 n(1+p0)4
1
n
−1
2

δ(1)AA,1
δ
(1)
Aa,0

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The two eigenvectors (v0 and v−) and their corresponding eigenvalues (λ0 and λ−) are
v0 =
n
2
 λ0 = 0
v− =
n(1 + p0)
−2
 λ− = −(2 + p0)
2
rn+10
Because the dominant eigenvalue is equal to zero, a calculation to leading order in  cannot
provide a condition for the invasion of the recessive police allele.
To see this more formally, an arbitrary initial perturbation to a resident A population
can be expressed as a linear superposition of the eigenvectors v0 and v−:δ(1)AA,1
δ
(1)
Aa,0
 = C0
n
2
+ C−
n(1 + p0)
−2
 exp(−(2 + p0)
2
rn+10 t
)
(A.21)
Here, C0 and C− are constants. We can substitute (A.20) and (A.18) into (A.17), substituting
the density constraints (A.14) and (A.19), keeping track of terms of order  and 2, and
dividing each term by one factor of . We get[
−δ˙(1)AA,0 − δ˙(2)AA,0
]
r
−(n+1)
0
=
2− n− np0
4n
(
−2δ(1)AA,1 + nδ(1)Aa,0
)
+ 
[
2− n− np0
4n
(
−2δ(2)AA,1 + nδ(2)Aa,0
)
+
−2 + np0
n
δ
(2)
AA,2
+
−2r 1
2n
r−10 + 2n
[
2−
(
2− p 1
2n
)
r 1
2n
r−10
]
− n2
(
1 + p 1
2n
)
r 1
2n
r−10
4n
δ
(2)
Aa,1
−n(1 + p0)
2
δ
(2)
aa,0
+
(1− p0)[3 + n(1− p0) + p0]
8n
[
δ
(1)
AA,1
]2
+
n(1 + p0)[3 + n+ (n− 1)p0]
32
[
δ
(1)
Aa,0
]2
+
3 + n− (n− 1)p20
8
δ
(1)
AA,1δ
(1)
Aa,0
]
(A.22)
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We can again substitute the density constraints (A.14) and (A.19) to rewrite the left-hand
side of (A.22). We can also substitute the general solution for the quantities δ
(1)
AA,1 and δ
(1)
Aa,0,
Eq. (A.21), into the right-hand side of (A.22):[
−δ˙(1)AA,1 − δ˙(1)Aa,0
]
r
−(n+1)
0 + 
[
−δ˙(2)AA,1 − δ˙(2)Aa,0 − δ˙(2)AA,2 − δ˙(2)Aa,1 − δ˙(2)aa,0
]
r
−(n+1)
0
=
2− n− np0
4n
[
−2
(
nC0 + n(1 + p0)C− exp
(−(2 + p0)
2
rn+10 t
))
+n
(
2C0 − 2C− exp
(−(2 + p0)
2
rn+10 t
))]
+ 
[
2− n− np0
4n
(
−2δ(2)AA,1 + nδ(2)Aa,0
)
+
−2 + np0
n
δ
(2)
AA,2
+
−2r 1
2n
r−10 + 2n
[
2−
(
2− p 1
2n
)
r 1
2n
r−10
]
− n2
(
1 + p 1
2n
)
r 1
2n
r−10
4n
δ
(2)
Aa,1
−n(1 + p0)
2
δ
(2)
aa,0
+
(1− p0)[3 + n(1− p0) + p0]
8n
[
δ
(1)
AA,1
]2
+
n(1 + p0)[3 + n+ (n− 1)p0]
32
[
δ
(1)
Aa,0
]2
+
3 + n− (n− 1)p20
8
δ
(1)
AA,1δ
(1)
Aa,0
]
(A.23)
Notice that each term in (A.23) involving the quantities δ
(2)
AA,1, δ
(2)
Aa,0, δ
(2)
AA,2, δ
(2)
Aa,1, and δ
(2)
aa,0
is multiplied by . In the limit  → 0, the quantities δ(2)AA,1, δ(2)Aa,0, δ(2)AA,2, δ(2)Aa,1, and δ(2)aa,0 are
irrelevant to the dynamics of the quantities δ
(1)
AA,1 and δ
(1)
Aa,0. However, the quantities δ
(1)
AA,1
and δ
(1)
Aa,0 alone do not provide information about whether or not the recessive police allele
invades a resident A population. Therefore, it is necessary to consider the terms of order
2 in our dynamical equations (A.17) to determine if a rare a allele can invade a resident A
population. In what follows, we use the eigenvector v0 corresponding to the zero eigenvalue,
i.e. δ(1)AA,1
δ
(1)
Aa,0
 = δ(1)AA,0
n+ 2
n
2
 (A.24)
Substituting (A.20), (A.18), and (A.24) into (A.17), substituting the density constraints
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(A.14) and (A.19), and keeping track of terms of order 2, we obtain
−δ˙(2)AA,0r−(n+1)0 =
2− n− np0
4n
(
−2δ(2)AA,1 + nδ(2)Aa,0
)
+
−2 + np0
n
δ
(2)
AA,2
+
−2r 1
2n
r−10 + 2n
[
2−
(
2− p 1
2n
)
r 1
2n
r−10
]
− n2
(
1 + p 1
2n
)
r 1
2n
r−10
4n
δ
(2)
Aa,1
− n(1 + p0)
2
δ
(2)
aa,0
+
n(n+ 3)
2(n+ 2)2
[
δ
(1)
AA,0
]2
(A.25)
We also obtain
δ˙
(2)
AA,1r
−(n+1)
0 =
1 + p0
4
(
−2δ(2)AA,1 + nδ(2)Aa,0
)
+ (1− p0)δ(2)AA,2
+
n+ 2 + (n− 2)p 1
2n
4
r 1
2n
r−10 δ
(2)
Aa,1
+
n(1 + p0)
2
δ
(2)
aa,0
− n(n+ 1)
(n+ 2)2
[
δ
(1)
AA,0
]2
δ˙
(2)
Aa,0r
−(n+1)
0 =
−1
2n
(
−2δ(2)AA,1 + nδ(2)Aa,0
)
+
2
n
δ
(2)
AA,2
+
1
2
r 1
2n
r−10 δ
(2)
Aa,1
+ δ
(2)
aa,0
− 2n
(n+ 2)2
[
δ
(1)
AA,0
]2
δ˙
(2)
AA,2r
−(n+1)
0 = − δ(2)AA,2 +
n(n− 1)
2(n+ 2)2
[
δ
(1)
AA,0
]2
δ˙
(2)
Aa,1r
−(n+1)
0 = − δ(2)Aa,1 +
2n
(n+ 2)2
[
δ
(1)
AA,0
]2
δ˙
(2)
aa,0r
−(n+1)
0 = − δ(2)aa,0 +
1
2n
r 1
2n
r−10 δ
(2)
Aa,1
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We can directly integrate the equation for δ˙
(2)
AA,2. We get
δ
(2)
AA,2 =
n(n− 1)
2(n+ 2)2
[
δ
(1)
AA,0
]2
[1− exp(−rn+10 t)] (A.26)
We can also directly integrate the equation for δ˙
(2)
Aa,1. We get
δ
(2)
Aa,1 =
2n
(n+ 2)2
[
δ
(1)
AA,0
]2
[1− exp(−rn+10 t)] (A.27)
We can use the solution for δ
(2)
Aa,1 to solve for δ
(2)
aa,0. We get
δ
(2)
aa,0 =
r 1
2n
r0(n+ 2)2
[
δ
(1)
AA,0
]2
[1− (1 + rn+10 t) exp(−rn+10 t)] (A.28)
Manipulating the equations for δ˙
(2)
AA,1 and δ˙
(2)
Aa,0, we obtain
r
−(n+1)
0
d
dt
(
−2δ(2)AA,1 + nδ(2)Aa,0
)
=
−(2 + p0)
2
(
−2δ(2)AA,1 + nδ(2)Aa,0
)
+ 2p0δ
(2)
AA,2
−
2 + (n− 2)p 1
2n
2
r 1
2n
r−10 δ
(2)
Aa,1
− np0δ(2)aa,0
+
2n
(n+ 2)2
[
δ
(1)
AA,0
]2
We can integrate this equation to solve for the quantity −2δ(2)AA,1 + nδ(2)Aa,0. We obtain
− 2δ(2)AA,1 + nδ(2)Aa,0
=
2n
[
2 + (n− 1)p0 −
(
2 + p0 + (n− 2)p 1
2n
)
r 1
2n
r−10
]
(n+ 2)2(2 + p0)
[
δ
(1)
AA,0
]2
+
2n
[
(n− 2)p 1
2n
r 1
2n
r−10 − p0
(
n− 1− (1 + rn+10 t)r 1
2n
r−10
)]
(n+ 2)2p0
[
δ
(1)
AA,0
]2
exp(−rn+10 t)
+
4n(n− 2)
(
p0 − p 1
2n
r 1
2n
r−10
)
(n+ 2)2p0(2 + p0)
[
δ
(1)
AA,0
]2
exp
(−(2 + p0)
2
rn+10 t
)
(A.29)
To see if the a allele is able to invade the resident A population, we must consider the
regime 1  t  −1. Notice that on a short time scale, each of the terms with time-
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dependence in Eqs. (A.26), (A.27), (A.28), and (A.29) will approach zero. The important
consideration is the sign of δ˙
(2)
AA,0 in the limit of large times t  1 but before the terms in
(A.18) become comparable in magnitude. Therefore, our condition for invasion of the police
allele is
lim
t→0
t→∞
δ˙
(2)
AA,0 > 0 (A.30)
Substituting (A.25), (A.26), (A.27), (A.28), and (A.29) into (A.30), we find that the recessive
allele for worker policing increases in frequency if
r 1
2n
r0
>
2(2 + n+ np0)
(2 + n)(2 + p0) + p 1
2n
(n− 2) (A.31)
Appendix A.3. Stability of a Dominant Worker Policing Allele
If we start with a population in which all workers are policing, and if we introduce a
small amount of the non-policing allele, A, and if the policing allele, a, is dominant, then is
policing evolutionarily stable?
There is a shortcut to obtaining the evolutionary stability condition for a dominant
policing allele. Recall what the calculations of Appendix A.2 for invasion of a recessive
policing allele are describing: We start with a homogeneous population of colonies in which
all individuals carry only the A allele. A fraction p0 of males are queen-derived, and each
colony has reproductive efficiency r0. The only effects of the mutant allele are to shift the
value of p such that pz > p0 for z > 0 and to modify the colony efficiency, rz 6= r0 for z > 0.
z here is the fraction of workers in a colony that are homozygous in the a allele.
Now consider the evolutionary stability of a dominant a allele that effects policing. Again,
in the calculation, we start with a homogeneous population of colonies, but in this case, all
individuals carry only the a allele. A fraction p1 of males are queen-derived, and each colony
has reproductive efficiency r1. The only effects of the mutant allele are to shift the value of
p such that p1−z < p1 for z > 0 and to modify the colony efficiency, r1−z 6= r1 for z > 0. z
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here is the fraction of workers in a colony that are homozygous in the A allele. (Since the
a allele for policing is dominant, AA workers have a distinct phenotype, while Aa and aa
workers have the same phenotype.)
Notice that, for worker policing, the mathematical analysis of invasion of a recessive
policing allele necessarily also provides the condition for evolutionary stability of a dominant
policing allele. Start with Condition (A.31). Because the genotype of the initial population
that we consider is reversed (i.e., all individuals initially carry only the a allele as opposed to
the A allele), we make the replacement z → 1− z in (A.31). Also, evolutionary stability of
the a allele means that the mutant allele for non-policing, A, is unable to invade a resident
a population, so we reverse the sign of the inequality in (A.31).
Thus, if the police allele, a, is dominant, then worker policing is evolutionarily stable if
r1
r 2n−1
2n
>
(2 + n)(2 + p1) + p 2n−1
2n
(n− 2)
2(2 + n+ np1)
Appendix A.4. Stability of a Recessive Worker Policing Allele
If we start with a population in which all workers are policing, and if we introduce a
small amount of the non-policing allele, A, and if the policing allele, a, is recessive, then is
policing evolutionarily stable?
There is a shortcut to obtaining the evolutionary stability condition for a recessive polic-
ing allele. Recall what the calculations of Appendix A.1 for invasion of a dominant policing
allele are describing: We start with a homogeneous population of colonies in which all indi-
viduals carry only the A allele. A fraction p0 of males are queen-derived, and each colony
has reproductive efficiency r0. The only effects of the mutant allele are to shift the value of
p such that pz > p0 for z > 0 and to modify the colony efficiency, rz 6= r0 for z > 0. z here
is the fraction of workers in a colony that carry at least one copy of the a allele.
Now consider the evolutionary stability of a recessive a allele that effects policing. Again,
in the calculation, we start with a homogeneous population of colonies, but in this case, all
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individuals carry only the a allele. A fraction p1 of males are queen-derived, and each colony
has reproductive efficiency r1. The only effects of the mutant allele are to shift the value of
p such that p1−z < p1 for z > 0 and to modify the colony efficiency, r1−z 6= r1 for z > 0. z
here is the fraction of workers in a colony that carry at least one copy of the A allele. (Since
the a allele for policing is recessive, AA and Aa workers have the same phenotype, while aa
workers have a distinct phenotype.)
Notice that, for worker policing, the mathematical analysis of invasion of a dominant
policing allele necessarily also provides the condition for evolutionary stability of a recessive
policing allele. Start with Condition (A.16). Because the genotype of the initial population
that we consider is reversed (i.e., all individuals initially carry only the a allele as opposed to
the A allele), we make the replacement z → 1− z in (A.16). Also, evolutionary stability of
the a allele means that the mutant allele for non-policing, A, is unable to invade a resident
a population, so we reverse the sign of the inequality in (A.16).
Thus, if the police allele, a, is recessive, then worker policing is evolutionarily stable if(
r1
rn−1
n
)[
2
(
r1
r 1
2
)
− 1
]
−
(
1− pn−1
n
)( r1
r 1
2
)
>
pn−1
n
+ p 1
2
2
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